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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of American water is a sordid tale. American sage Mark
Twain purportedly said "whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over."'
I
Thomas L. Sansonetti & Sylvia Quast, Not Just A Western Issue Anymore:
Water Disputes in the Eastern United States, 34 CuMB. L. REv. 185, 185 (2003Published
by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
1
2004).
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Today the American West looks much different than it did in Mark Twain's
time, primarily because the cities of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Las Vegas,
Phoenix, Salt Lake City, Albuquerque, and Denver have relied on water
transfers, such as transbasin diversions or interbasin transfers, to sustain
their populations. 2 Leading western food producing areas including California's Central and Imperial Valleys, Idaho's Snake River Valley, Washington's Yakima Valley, and Colorado's Larimer and Weld Counties have also
relied on water transfers for production.3 For example, California's Imperial
Valley flourishes in a once dry valley in part because of a complicated water
transfer system. The success of many western cities and agricultural areas
depends on the quality of the water supply.5 For example, if these transfers
relay salty, industrial wastewater then this water may react with the soil and
kill all the plants.6 Such transfers of dirty water may consequently deprive
farmers and ranchers of their very livelihood.' The reliance on water transfers is not unique to the American West.
The rising demand for water in the eastern United States has been
marked by a rise in water transfers and water quality issues.' Since before
World War II, New York City has relied on a transfer of water that mixed
pristine water with muddy water for its water supply.9 More recently, a New
Hampshire ski area planned to transfer water from a river that was known to
peel the paint off of nearby buildings in order to make snow.'° A historic
remnant of the Florida Everglades is today overgrown with slimy algae
blooms as a result of an unregulated water transfer." As Thomas L. Sansonetti and Sylvia Quast deftly observed, "Rudyard Kipling's line about 'East is
East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet' no longer applies, at

2. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner at 2, S.Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004) (No. 02-626) [hereinafter Colorado Brief]; Catskill Mountain Chapter of
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 489 (2d Cir. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2003).
3. Colorado Brief, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1162
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003).
7. See id.
8. Sansonetti, supra note 1, at 185-86.
9. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 484.
10. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273, 1297 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S.
1119 (1997).
See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
11.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
101 (2004), reh "gdenied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
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least when it comes to disputes over water."' 2 The twain do meet in the national challenge regarding water quality. 3 Dirty water is an American issue.
Perhaps as a response to the Cuyahoga River bursting into flames as
a result of water pollution, 4 the Clean Water Act (CWA) was enacted "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."' 5 To achieve the CWA's purpose of clean American waters, and to balance each state's water allocation rights, the CWA employs a
system of "cooperative federalism."' 6 The federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) oversees National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permitting programs that have been implemented by nearly all
states

7

and twenty-seven American Indian tribes.' 8 The NPDES program

regulates the discharge of pollutants into the Nation's waters in order to ensure water quality."' The NPDES permitting system is the cornerstone of the
CWA.2 °
The unitary waters theory is the EPA's position that when Congress
enacted the CWA it intended that all waters within the borders of the United
States be regulated as one big body of water. 2' According to the EPA, the
waters in the United States are not thousands of distinct and different rivers,
streams, lakes, and ponds.22 Rather, they are all one body of water and for
that reason can be mixed together without an NPDES permit.23 Under this
theory, the fact that American waters have different physical integrities, such
as some are warm and others are cold, is irrelevant. 24 Also irrelevant is the
12.

Sansonetti, supra note 1, at 186.

13.
See id.
14.
Kenneth M. Murchinson, Learning From More Than Five-and-a-HalfDecades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 527, 585 (2005).

15.

Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).

16.
Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems
Under Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 204 n. 16 (2005).
17.
Id.

18. Brief Amici Curiae of the National Tribal Environmental Council and the
National Congress of American Indians in Support of Respondents at 3, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626)
[hereinafter NTEC & NCAI Brief]. For a critique of treating sovereign tribes as
states, see Dean B. Suagee, The Indian Country Environmental Justice Clinic:
From Vision to Reality, 23 VT. L. REv. 567, 567-68 (1999).
19.
Benson, supranote 16, at 200.

20. N.R.D.C. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 10506 (2004), reh 'gdenied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
22.
23.

See, e.g., id.
Id.

24. Cf. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006 Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New 3
York, 273 F.3d 481, 494 (2d Cir. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb.
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fact that American waters have different chemical integrities, such as some
are naturally salty and others naturally arsenic. 25 Even the visual example
that American waters have different biological integrities, such as some are
home to alligators and some to beavers, is irrelevant.26 By the unitary waters
logic, if one transfers dirty water from a city lagoon into a pristine mountain
stream full of fish, then there is no addition of a toxic or pollutant to the
stream.2 1 Therefore, there is no need for a state, a tribe, or the EPA, to regulate the transfer with an NPDES permit.28 One may be better off drinking
whiskey than the dirty water the EPA is fighting to save from NPDES regulation through its unitary waters theory.
The unitary waters theory ought to be summarily rejected by the
courts. Part ImI (A) of this comment discusses the inconsistency of the unitary waters theory with both the plain language of the CWA and current
EPA regulation regarding discharges. Part III (B) maintains that innovative
NPDES permitting is capable of regulating water transfers free of extreme
cost or delay without the unitary waters theory to lighten the regulatory load.
Part III (C) makes the case that the unitary waters theory can lead to environmental injustice by allowing unregulated pollution to be discharged into
important cultural areas. Finally, Part III (D) reasons that there are no formal government documents, or strong policy arguments, to support the
EPA's position and thus the theory should be given little to no judicial deference.
This comment will first explore the regulatory backdrop and case
law development of the unitary waters theory. The regulatory backdrop in
Part II (A) explains NPDES programs, permits, and citizen suit challenges.
Part II (B) then provides an overview of the judicial deference due to a regulating agency's statutory interpretation. Part I (C) collects the earliest cases
to delve into the principles that later became the unitary waters theory beginning with the dam cases. These cases included: National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch29 and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power.3" Additionally, the United States Supreme Court granted certiori
over a dam case, S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of EnvironmentalProtec-

21, 2003). For a thorough discussion of chemical, biological, ecosystem, social, and
legal integrity in the CWA, see also Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerationsfor Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009 (2005).
25. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 494.
26. Cf id.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106
27.
(2004), reh "gdenied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).

28.

Id.

29.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
30.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
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tion, which will be decided in the October Term 2005."' Part II (D) lays out
the more recent federal circuit pumping station cases to have analyzed the
unitary waters theory. These cases included: Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture; 2 Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. City of New York;33 and Northern PlainsResource Council v. Fidelity
Exploration & Development Co.34 Finally, Part II (E) analyzes the muchstudied United States Supreme Court case of South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.35 Miccosukee is presently on
remand to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for the
factual determination of whether the two bodies of water in the litigation are
meaningfully distinct or a unitary body of water.36 Miccosukee's progeny
may change the way all states regulate their waters and issue NPDES permits for water transfers.37
This comment will next analyze four key issues presented by the
case law. The first issue is whether the CWA was enacted for the protection
of all bodies of water in the United States as one unitary body of water. The
second issue is whether NPDES permitting becomes practically impossible
to administer without the help of unitary waters theory because so many
transfers would need to be regulated. The third issue is whether the unitary
waters theory leads to environmental injustice because it allows certain
populations of people to disproportionately shoulder the burden of unregulated discharges. The final issue is what level of deference the EPA's unitary waters theory ought to be afforded upon judicial review.
II. BACKGROUND

A. NPDES Programs,Permits,and CWA Citizen Suit Challenges
The
The CWA established the NPDES permitting program."
NPDES program does not stop all harmful activities.39 Rather, the NPDES
31.

S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d 210 (Me. 2005), cert.

granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005) (No. 04-1527), argued,(Feb. 21, 2006).

32. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119
(1997).
33.
Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2003).
34. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dcv. Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003).
35.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
36. Id. at 112.
37.
Peter D. Nichols, Miccosukee: The Potentialfor Clean Water Act Discharge
Permits For Water Transfers, 33 CoLo. LAW. 119, 119 (2004).
U.S.C. § 1342
§ 402, 33
Clean
WaterofAct
38.by Law
Published
Archive
Wyoming
Scholarship,
2006(2000).
5
Benson, supra note 16, at 200-01.
39.
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program "prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from a point source into
navigable waters, unless the discharger possesses a valid permit authorizing
the release of the particular pollutant discharged in the specific amount, or
concentration, contained in the discharge." After an opportunity for a public hearing, the EPA Administrator may issue a permit for the discharge of a
pollutant (or pollutants) upon one of two conditions: the discharge will meet
all applicable requirements under the CWA, or the discharge will meet additional requirements the Administrator determines to be necessary.4' Such
additional requirements may include data collecting, information collecting,
and reporting.42
The EPA set minimum procedural guidelines and other elements for
NPDES
programs and tribal NPDES programs (collectively referred to
state
as State programs) " in order to establish nationally "uniform application
forms and other minimum requirements. .. .""

A State may submit a de-

scription of its proposed NPDES program for approval by the EPA Administrator.4" Even after program approval, the EPA Administrator may suspend
Robert W. Vinal, Proofof Wrongful Dischargeof Pollutant Into Waterway
40.
under FederalClean Water Act, 36 AM. JUR. 3D ProofofFacts § 2 (2005) (citing 33

U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342).
41.
Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000).
402(a)(1) states:

Section

Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the
Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a
permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pol-

lutants, notwithstanding section 1311 (a) of this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and

1343 of this title, or (B) prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions
as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
42.

Clean Water Act

§ 402(a)(2). Section 402(a)(2) states: "[tjhe Administrator

shall prescribe conditions for such permits to assure compliance with the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions on data and information collection, reporting, and such other requirements as he deems appropriate." Id.
43. § 518(e). Section 518(e) states: "[t]he Administrator is authorized to treat an
Indian tribe as a State for purposes of subchapter II of this chapter and [section
1342] .... " Id.

44. § 304(h)(i)(1). Section 304 (h)(i)(1) states: "[t]he Administrator shall (1)
within sixty days after October 18, 1972, promulgate guidelines for the purpose of
establishing uniform application forms and other minimum requirements for the
acquisition of information from owners and operators of point-sources of discharge
subject to any State program under section 1342 of this title ....
" Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8

45.

§ 402(b). Section 402(b) states:
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the State's issuance of NPDES permits46 or withdraw a State's approved
47
program if the program fails to conform to the established EPA guidelines.

At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines required by
subsection (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Governor of each
State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges
into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may submit to the
Administrator a full and complete description of the program it
proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an
interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit a statement
from the attorney general (or the attorney for those State water
pollution control agencies which have independent legal counsel),
or from the chief legal officer in the case of an interstate agency,
that the laws of such State, or the interstate compact, as the case
may be, provide adequate authority to carry out the described program. The Administrator shall approve each such submitted program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist.

Id.
46.

§ 402(c)(1). Section 402(c)(1) states:
Not later than ninety days after the date on which a State has submitted a program (or revision thereof) pursuant to subsection (b)
of this section, the Administrator shall suspend the issuance of
permits under subsection (a) of this section as to those discharges
subject to such program unless he determines that the State permit
program does not meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this
section or does not conform to the guidelines issued under section
1314(i)(2) of this title. If the Administrator so determines, he
shall notify the State of any revisions or modifications necessary
to conform to such requirements or guidelines.

Id.
47.

§402(c)(3). Section 402(c)(3) states:
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that a
State is not administering a program approved under this section
in accordance with requirements of this section, he shall so notify
the State and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a
reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall
withdraw approval of such program. The Administrator shall not
withdraw approval of any such program unless he shall first have
notified the State, and made public, in writing, the reasons for
such withdrawal.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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Any citizen is authorized to sue any person on the citizen's own behalf through a CWA citizen suit.4" The United States District Courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear CWA citizen suits regardless of the amount in
controversy between the parties or State citizenship of the parties when all
the elements are met.49 The citizen may sue "the United States, and ... any
other governmental instrumentality or agency. . ." for: an alleged violation

of an effluent standard; an alleged violation of any limitation under the
CWA; or an alleged violation of an Administrator's order or State's order.50
A citizen may seek to enforce the standard or limitation that is being violated, to force the Administrator to act, and civil penalties."' The citizen may
not commence an action until first giving the potential defendant and Administrator, or State, sixty-days notice. 2 Any citizen may intervene as a
matter of right when the Administrator or State is pursuing a violation in

48.
§ 505(a)(1).
See Annotation, Citizen's action under 33 U.S.C.A. §
1365(A)(1) for violation of effluent standards or limitations under Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq.) or orders with respect thereto, 68
A.L.R. FED. 701 (1984) (illustrating examples of successful and unsuccessful citizen's actions for CWA violations).
49.
Clean Water Act § 505(a)(2). Section 505(a)(2) states any citizen may commence a suit "[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties ... ." Id.
50.
§ 505(a)(l)-(2). Sections 505(a)(l)-(2) state any citizen may also commence
a suit:
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permit-

ted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged
to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or . . . against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator ....
Id. See Elaine K. Zipp, Annotation, Citizen 's action against administratorof environmentalprotection agency to compel performance of nondiscretionaryduty under
§ 505(A)(2) of Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972 (33
US.C.A. § 1365(A)(2)), 57 A.L.R. FED. 851 (1982) (illustrating examples of suc-

cessful and unsuccessful challenges for a failure to perform nondiscretionary duties).
51. Clean Water Act § 505(a)(2). See Andrew Oliveira, Christopher Schenck,
Christopher D. Cole & Nicole L. James, Environmental Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L.

REV. 347 (2005) (illustrating examples of CWA civil and criminal penalties).
52.
Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(A). Section 505(b)(1)(A) states that no citizen
suit may commence "prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the

alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order...
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
."Id.
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court." The Administrator may also intervene as a matter of right when any
citizen is pursuing a violation in court.54
An NPDES permit violation has five elements: the "discharge," of a
"pollutant," from a "point source," into "navigable waters," "without a permit"." Under the CWA, a "discharge" is defined as the addition of any pollutant.56 The CWA does not define the term "addition. 57 A "pollutant" is
broadly defined to include biological materials, heat, rock, sand, and agricultural waste, among other examples5 8 A "point source" is defined as any
53.
§ 505(b)(1)(B). Section 505(b)(1)(B) states that no citizen suit may commence "if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the
United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right." Id.
54. § 505(c)(2). Section 505(c)(2) states that: "[i]n such action under this section, the Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right." Id.
55.
§§ 502(12), 301(a), 402. See, e.g., Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Actions
brought under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean
Water Act) (33 US.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.) - Supreme Court cases, 163 A.L.R. FED.

531 (2000) (compiling CWA citizen suits before the Supreme Court).
56.
§ 502(12). Section 502(12) states:
The term 'discharge of a pollutant' and the term 'discharge of pollutants' each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to
the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point
source other than a vessel or other floating craft.
Id.
57.
58.

Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Clean Water Act § 502(6). Section 502(6) states:

The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked
or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. This term
does not mean (A) "sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental
to the normal operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces" within
the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas, or
other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production
of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority
of the State in which the well is located, and if such State determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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discernible, confined, discrete conveyance.59 "Navigable waters" include
traditionally navigable waters and also non-navigable waters that drain into
navigable waters as all courts have held that navigability in fact is not required.6 ° In summary, any person may sue any entity because without an
NPDES permit, "almost any structure which conveys almost any type of
material into almost any body of surface water constitutes an illegal discharge under the CWA ....
B.

JudicialReview of a RegulatingAgency's Statutory Interpretation

When an agency's statutory interpretation is challenged, the court
first gives the agency an appropriate level of judicial deference and then tests
the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation against that deference. 62 In
the seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress's explicit and
implicit legislative delegation to an agency to interpret a statute bars a court
from substituting its own statutory construction. 63 For example, "[t]he
agency's construction must be upheld if, in light of the appropriate degree of
deference, it is 'sufficiently reasonable', even if it is not 'the only reasonable
one or even the reading the court would have reached' on its own."
The
courts will not automatically grant a regulating agency's interpretation
Chevron deference.6 5 Since Chevron, "a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorizations to enId.
59.

§ 502(14). Section 502(14) states:
The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.
This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and
return flows from irrigated agriculture.

Id. See also Ronald I. Mirvis, Annotation, What constitutes "'pointsource" ofpollution subject to control by provisionsof Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (33
U.S.C.A. § 1362(14)), 52 A.L.R. FED. 885 (1981) (giving examples of CWA point

sources).
60. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165.
61. Vinal, supra note 40, § 2.
62. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156.
63. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See Kristine
Cordier Karnezis, Construction and Application of "Chevron Deference" to AdministrativeAction by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 2D 25 (2005).
64. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 171.
65. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8 218, 226-27 (2001) (citations omitted).
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gage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations
or rulings for which deference is claimed."'
Even if the agency's interpretation is not afforded Chevron deference, it may receive a spectrum of judicial respect upon review. When the
agency has engaged in neither notice-and-comment rulemaking nor formal
adjudication, the court will defer to the agency's interpretation after weighing the Skidmore factors of: "the degree of [the] agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness. .. ."' The court may then give a
"spectrum of responses" ranging from "great respect" to "indifference."6'
C.

The Dam Cases

Though the unitary waters theory claims that all waters within the
borders of the United States are one body of water,69 the issues involved in
the dam cases are closely related. Two key federal cases examined whether
an NPDES permit is required for a dam that discharges removed water back
into the original water body.7" These two dam cases questioned whether the
"pollutant" was introduced from the outside world 7' and this analysis is still
used in unitary waters litigation today.
1.

National Wildlife Federationv. Gorsuch

The first key case to question whether an NPDES permit would be
required for the discharge of water back into the same water body was National Wildlife Federationv. Gorsuch.72 The National Wildlife Federation
(the plaintiffs), along with the State of Missouri as intervenor, petitioned the
district court to declare that the EPA and Administrator Anne Gorsuch had
violated a nondiscretionary duty when the EPA generally failed to require
NPDES permits for the discharge of dam water.73 The plaintiffs complained
dams caused water quality changes resulting in low dissolved oxygen, dissolved minerals, dissolved nutrients, water temperature changes, sediment
release and/or supersaturation of oxygen in both a dam's reservoir and the
river downstream.7 4 Commentators have since described the effects of these
66. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30 (reviving the Skidmore analysis).
67. Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
68. Id.
69. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 10506 (2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
70. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
71.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174-75; Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584.
72. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
73.
Id. at 161. The challenge was regarding a general failure to require NPDES
permits
and
was not
failure to require
a permit
for one particular dam. Id.
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water quality changes on the fish downstream from the dam as creating "asphyxiated fish.""5 All parties agreed that dams can be a "point source,"
among other things, but disputed whether dams' above described effects
were "pollutants" and an "addition" of a pollutant, among other things."
The district court issued a declaration and an order that the EPA had
a nondiscretionary duty to require dam operators to obtain discharge permits.77 The district court afforded the EPA's "more tortured" interpretation
of "addition", that the pollutants were not introduced from the outside world,
little deference because it offered no scientific expertise, advanced no policy
reasons, was "counter to expressed congressional intent, and [was] inconsistent with [the EPA's] own implementation of the [CWA] in other contexts."7" The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.79 The EPA appealed the decision. 0
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit considered "whether certain daminduced water quality changes constitute the 'discharge of a pollutant' as
that term is defined in CWA section 502(12)."sI The D.C. Circuit characterized the issue as one of CWA construction; namely if the CWA mandated
that dam-induced water quality changes must be regulated under the NPDES
regulatory regime.82 The plaintiffs asserted that the purpose of the CWA
was broad enough to include the dam-induced water quality changes. 3 In
opposition, the EPA argued that the purpose of the CWA was narrow and
dam-induced water quality changes would instead be rightly regulated under
state-developed non-point source pollution programs.8 4
Both parties analyzed principles similar to what later became the
unitary waters theory to support their CWA interpretations.85 The plaintiffs
laid out their NPDES permit violation argument.86 The plaintiffs argued that
"any adverse change in the quality of reservoir water from its natural state
involves a 'pollutant' and that release of polluted water through the dam into
the downstream river constitutes the 'addition' of a pollutant to navigable
waters 'from' a point source."8 7 In denial, the EPA stated there was no
75. Klein, supra note 24, at 1020.
76. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165.
77. Id. at 161.
78. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 156, 161.
81.
Id.
82. Id. at 165-66.
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id. at 165-66.
85. Id. at 165.
86. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
87. Id. at 165.
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NPDES violation because the pollutant was already in the water and was not
generated by the dam as a CWA "point source.""8 In support of this proposi-

tion, the EPA floated its outside world test:
for addition of a pollutant from a point source to occur,
the point source must introduce the pollutant into navigable water from the outside world; dam-caused pollution, in contrast, merely passes through the dam from
one body of navigable water (the reservoir) into another (the downstream river)., 9
The EPA then argued that in this case the pollutant was not added from the
outside world but was already in the body of water. 90 Therefore, no NPDES
permit was necessary. 9
The D.C. Circuit gave great deference to the EPA's interpretations. 9
The court concluded the EPA was due deference based on the "usual factors" because: it was the CWA's regulatory agency, it was consistent, its
construction was contemporaneous, it had scientific expertise, Congress acquiesced in its interpretation, and it was sufficiently thorough. 3 The D.C.
Circuit used two internal EPA documents to find strong policy support for
the EPA's position and to meet these factors in order to grant Chevron deference to the EPA. 94 Therefore, the court held the EPA's interpretations
were supported. 95 The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's judgment
and found that the EPA's outside world construction did not frustrate the
purpose of the CWA.' The D.C. Circuit cautioned, however, that this was a
narrow decision that did not decide what constitutes a discharge of a pollutant under the CWA, but rather that the court found the EPA's CWA interpretation to be reasonable.

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

See id.

92. Id. at 169.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 169-70 (citing Letter from Alan Kirk, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and General Counsel, EPA, to Regional Counsels (Aug. 1, 1974); EPA
Office of General Counsel, Action Memorandum on Issuing NPDES Permits to
Dams (1978)).
95.
Id. at 171-77 (interpreting "addition," "pollutant," and "from").
96.by Law
Id,
at 183. of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
Published
Archive
13
97.
Id.

414

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 6 [2006], No. 2, Art. 8

2.

Vol. 6

National Wildlife Federationv. Consumers Power

The second dam case to consider whether an NPDES permit would
be required for a dam was National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power.98 The National Wildlife Federation (the plaintiffs), an environmental
organization, filed a CWA citizen suit against the Consumers Power Company, a hydroelectric power business, to force Consumers Power to apply for
an NPDES permit for its Ludington facility. 9 The Ludington facility, one of
the largest hydroelectric power facilities in the U.S., uses reversible turbines
to divert water four hundred feet uphill from Lake Michigan into a storage
reservoir, then it reverses the turbines to allow the water to gush back to
Lake Michigan, thus generating power.' ° In the process, fish and other
aquatic organisms are carried with the water creating greater force to generate power, but few survive the turbines.' ' The fish and other aquatic organ0 2
isms are discharged back into Lake Michigan as a sort of "fish smoothie."'
The plaintiffs prevailed when the district court ordered Consumers Power to
apply for an NPDES permit from the Michigan Water Resources Commission (MWRC) within sixty days.0 3 Consumers Power appealed, and the
order to apply for an NPDES permit was stayed."°
The Sixth Circuit applied the five elements for an NPDES violation
and framed the issue on appeal as whether the Ludington facility "adds" a
pollutant to Lake Michigan. 5 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the term
"addition" was not defined by the CWA and therefore was an issue for EPA
interpretation." 6 In its amicus brief, the EPA proposed the outside world
test, which was based on unitary waters theory principles to support its interpretation of "any." 0 7 The Sixth Circuit looked to the previous Gorsuch
decision and acknowledged that the "EPA also argued, as it does here, that
there can be no addition unless a source 'physically introduces a pollutant
into water from the outside world." 0 8 Therefore, the EPA asserted both in

98. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
99. Id. at 581.
100. Id. at 581-82.
101. Id. at 582.
102. Id.
103. Id.
at 581.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 583-84. The five elements of a violation are: 1) the "discharge," 2) of a
"pollutant" 3) from a "point source" 4) to a "navigable water" 5) without an NPDES
permit. Id. at 583.
106. Id. at 584.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d. 156, 175 (D.C. Cir.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
1982)).
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Gorsuch and this case that no NPDES permit was necessary because the fish
were already in the water and not introduced from the outside world."
The EPA then refined its outside world argument before the Sixth
Circuit by demonstrating when pollutants are added from the outside
world."' The EPA began by conceding that American seafood processors
add fish smoothie from their processing plants into the waters of the United
States, just as Consumers Power did in the instant case."' The EPA had
issued effluent guidelines in order to regulate the seafood processors' discharge." 2 The EPA argued that the seafood processors' fish smoothie was
distinguishable from the instant case because the seafood processors' fish
smoothie left the waters of the United States." 3 The processors took the live
seafood out of the water, turned it into a fish smoothie in the plant, then discharged it back into the waters of the United States." 4 Thus, the seafood
processors' discharge of the fish smoothie was from the outside world."' As
in direct contrast with the seafood processors, the EPA argued that because
the live fish from Lake Michigan were pulled uphill in the water, then the
dead fish were returned downhill in the same water and discharged back into
Lake Michigan, they never left the waters of the United States." l6 The EPA
then concluded that the Consumers Power unregulated discharge of a fish
smoothie was distinguishable from the seafood processors' regulated discharge as Consumers Power fish smoothie never left the water and as such
was not introduced from the outside world." 7
The Sixth Circuit sided with the EPA."' The Sixth Circuit concluded that Chevron substantial deference applied and that the EPA's interpretation was a permissible construction of the word "addition" in the
CWA." 9' Relying heavily on the D.C. Circuit's reasoning, the court stated
the EPA's reasonable interpretation was not contrary to any CWA policies
or its legislative history.' 20 The Sixth Circuit then drew an analogy to the
Chevron case: "Chevron rejected a court's attempt at redefining an undefined statutory term in terms of the 'general purpose' of the statute, when the
agency has already defined the term.''
The court concluded against this
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at585.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 584, 585.

116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119. Id.at 584.
120. Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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backdrop of Chevron deference "[a]ny water quality change resulting from
the release of entrained fish at the Ludington facility is simply not, giving
proper deference to the EPA definition, from the physical introduction of a
pollutant from the outside world."' Therefore, the court held that Consumers Power did not need to obtain an NPDES permit for the discharge of the
The district court's decision was reMichigan.'
fish smoothie into Lake
24
remanded.
and
versed
3.

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of EnvironmentalProtection

Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari over a
dam case, S.D. Warren Company v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection. 25 South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, the United States Supreme Court pumping station case discussed
infra in part II (E) below, may have impliedly overturned National Wildlife
Federation v. Gorsuch and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power because Miccosukee held that the point source itself need not generate the pollutant. 26 Moreover, Gorsuch and Consumers Power were litigated in the 1980s, before considerable development in the law of judicial
deference to agency interpretation. 27 Therefore, the petitioner S.D. Warren
Company queried the Supreme Court: "Does the mere flow of water
through an existing dam constitute a 'discharge' under [slection 401, 33
U.S.C. [section] 1341, of the Clean Water Act, despite this Court's holding
last year in Miccosukee that a discharge requires an addition of water from a
distinct body of water?"'2 The outcome of this hydroelectric dam decision
and the analysis of the outside world test are closely related to the unitary
waters theory.

122.
123.
124.

Id. at 586.
Id. at 590.
Id.

125.

S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d 210 (Me. 2005), cert.

granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005) (No. 04-1527), argued,(Feb. 21, 2006).
126. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105
(2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that an
agency ruling is entitled to deference only to the degree of the ruling's persuasiveness.).
128. For the question presented, see Supreme Court of the United States Docket
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/0404-1527
Question Presented,
for
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
0 15 2 7

qp.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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The FederalCircuitPumping Station Cases

Three key federal cases have examined the unitary waters theory in
the context of pumping stations. 29 These cases directly considered the unitary waters theory. 3 ' The framework for analyzing whether an NPDES
permit is required is that the court first place itself in the shoes of the receiving water and then determine whether the pollutant would reach the receiving water had it not been for the water transfer.'
1.

Dubois v. United States Department ofAgriculture

The first key case to discuss the unitary waters theory was Dubois v.
United States Department of Agriculture.3 2 Dubois filed a citizen suit
against the Forest Service, an agency of the United States Department of
Agriculture, for failing to require the Loon Mountain Ski Area (Ski Area) to
obtain an NPDES permit. 33 The Ski Area had requested to expand its
snowmaking facilities by augmenting its diversion from Loon Pond
through a water transfer from the East Branch of the Pemigewasset
River (East Branch). 134 The Forest Service oversaw the portion of the
Ski Area located in the White Mountain National Forest (Forest) and
thus required an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to determine
the expansion's impact on the Forest and to determine if an NPDES
permit was necessary for the water transfer.'3 5 After the EIS, the Forest Service determined that no NPDES permit was necessary and Du36
bois challenged the decision.
The district court found the NPDES permit elements of the of
a "discharge" of a "pollutant" "from a point source" to "a navigable
water" but did not find an "addition" requirement of a "discharge,"
reasoning that the two bodies of water were legally one body of water.'3 7 The district court first found, and the parties agreed, that Loon
129. Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2003);
Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119
(1997); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003).
130. Catskill, 273 F.3d 481; Dubois, 102 F.3d 1273; Fidelity, 325 F.3d 1155.
131. Fidelity, 325 F.3dat 1162.
132. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119
(1997).
133. Id. at 1273.
134. Id. at 1277-78.
135. Id. at 1278.
136. Id. at 1280.
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Pond was a "water of the United States."' 3 8 The district court then
found that the Ski Area "discharged" the East Branch water, which
was a "pollutant," "through its snowmaking pipes into Loon Pond."'
For these reasons, both parties agreed there was a "discharge" of a
"pollutant" from a "point source" within the meaning of the CWA.' °
Turning to the unitary waters theory, the district court reasoned that
the East Branch and Loon Pond were all part of"a singular entity, 'the
waters of the United States. """' The district court upheld the singular
water concept by clarifying that "the bodies of water are not to be
considered individually in this context."' 42 The district court concluded that the transfer of water from the East Branch into Loon Pond
would not constitute an "addition" of the East Branch into Loon
Pond.'43 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest
Service.'44
The First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision and framed
the issue as whether there was an "addition.' 45 Though not using the
terms "unitary waters theory," the First Circuit rejected the "singular
waters" principle and the "singular waters" interpretation of an "addition."'" The First Circuit held that the transfer of water from the East
Branch to Loon Pond would not occur naturally and held when "water
leaves the domain of nature and is subject to private control rather
than purely natural processes ... it has lost its status as waters of the
United States."' 47 Therefore, the court found that the East Branch and
Loon Pond were two separate "waters of the United States" and by
extension the proposed transfer of water from one to the other constituted an "addition."' 14 The First Circuit spelled out "where, as [was]
undisputed... the discharge is through a point source and the intake
49
water contains pollutants, an NPDES permit is required."'

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1296.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1296.
144. Id. at 1277.
145. Id. at 1296.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1296-97.
148. Id. at 1299.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
149. Id.
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419

The First Circuit acknowledged the significance of its rejection of
the unitary waters theory for water quality." 0 The First Circuit shed light on
the deeper issue before the court: "We can take judicial notice that the
Pemigewasset River was for years one of the most polluted rivers in New
England, the repository for raw sewage from factories and towns. It emitted
an overwhelming odor and was known to peel the paint off buildings located
on its banks." '' The First Circuit feared that under the unitary waters theory, Loon Pond may suffer the fate of Pemigewasset River." 2 Hence, the
First Circuit cogently reversed the district court.'
2.

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited Inc. v.
City of New York

The second key case to discuss the unitary waters theory was Catskill Mountains Chapterof Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York. 5 4 Environmental and recreational organizations (the plaintiffs) brought a CWA
citizen suit against the City of New York (City).' Since World War II, the
City has obtained its drinking water by diverting water from the Schoharie
Reservoir through the Shandaken Tunnel to the Esopus Creek, which pours
into the Ashokan Reservoir." 6 The plaintiffs argued that instead of applying the outside-world test from the dam cases the court should apply a butfor test, meaning without the Shandaken Tunnel, Schoharie Reservoir would
not "hydrologically connect" to Esopus Creek."' Thus, plaintiffs argued the
Shandaken Tunnel was a "discharge" of a "pollutant" to Esopus Creek. s'
The plaintiffs concluded that the two bodies of water were distinct and connecting them required an NPDES permit. 9 Nevertheless, the district court
granted the City's motion to dismiss because there was no "discharge" of a
pollutant because there was no addition of a pollutant.'"
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding that there
was no "discharge."'' The court held that the EPA's policy of not requiring

150. Id. at 1297.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1301.
154. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2003).
155. Id. at 484.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 491.
158. Id. at 485.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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an NPDES permit for water transfers and the EPA's interpretation of "addition" were not due Chevron deference." 2 The Second Circuit explained:
[i]n several policy statements made in opinion letters and
reports to Congress in the 1970s and 1980s, the EPA took
the position that dam releases should not be considered
"discharges" under the CWA and thus NPDES permits
would not be required for those releases. [See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d. 156, 167-69 (D.C. Cir.
1982)]. This position was never formalized in a notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication under the [Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (2000)],
although the EPA subsequently reiterated its position in the
Gorsuch and Consumers Power cases, as a defendant and
amicus curiae, respectively.'63
Based on CWA section 502(14), the court found that the point source need
not generate the pollutant in order to be a CWA point source subject to an
NPDES permit."6 Turning to the "singular entity" theory supporting the
EPA's "addition" interpretation, the Second Circuit pointed out:
[s]uch a theory would mean that movement of water from
one discrete water body to another would not be an addition
even if it involved a transfer of water from a water body
contaminated with myriad pollutants to a pristine water
body containing few or no pollutants. Such an interpretation
is inconsistent
with the ordinary meaning of the word "addi165
tion."
Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's analysis and
held the City must obtain an NPDES permit."6

162. Id. at 491.
163. Id. at 489-90.
164. Id. at 493.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 494. After Miccosukee, the City has appealed its roughly 5.75 million
dollar penalty, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New
York, 244 F. Supp. 2d 41, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), based on a unitary waters theory
argument that the two bodies of water are not meaningfully distinct. Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2003); Timothy S. Bishop,
The Clean Water Act in the Supreme Court: Recent Developments, SK037 A.L.I.https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
A.B.A. 121, 129 (2004).
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3.

NorthernPlainsResource Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Development Co.

The third key federal circuit case to discuss the unitary waters theory
was Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Development Co.' 67 The Northern Plains Resource Council (the plaintiffs), a conservation group, brought a CWA citizen suit against Fidelity Exploration &
Development Company (Fidelity). 68 Plaintiffs complained of un-permitted
groundwater that Fidelity pumped into the Tongue River from its coal-bed
methane (CBM) development in the Powder River Basin. 6 9 The Montana
Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) advised Fidelity that it did
not need a Montana NPDES permit for this process because CBM water
(which in this case was salty, yet unaltered, groundwater) was exempt from
Montana's permitting scheme. 7 ' Nevertheless, the MDEQ warned Fidelity
71
that the EPA did not provide such an exception for its NPDES permit.'
The plaintiffs also argued for a but-for test, stating that the unaltered
groundwater would not ordinarily reach the Tongue River without Fidelity
pumping the ground water into the Tongue River.'7 2 Therefore, the plaintiffs
maintained that the addition of the CBM groundwater to the Tongue River
required an NPDES permit because it was a "discharge" of a "pollutant."'" a
The district court granted summary judgment for Fidelity and held that the
CBM groundwater was not a CWA "pollutant.' 7 4 The plaintiffs appealed to
the Ninth Circuit.'5
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the principles behind the unitary waters
theory when examining whether unaltered water can be a "pollutant.' ' 76 The
court stated that the relevant body of water for the analysis was the Tongue
River, thus the court put itself in the shoes of the receiving water. 77 In this
case, the Ninth Circuit examined the effect on the Tongue River and illuminated that "[b]y discharging CBM water into the Tongue River, Fidelity alters the water quality of the Tongue River. '1 7
Though not stating it as
167. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003).
168. Id. at 1157.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1157-59.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1158.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1160.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1162.
177. Id.
178. Id. CBM water is groundwater that is released from the coal seam during the
methane
gasArchive
extraction
process, Scholarship,
and not surface
water, which the CWA was written 21
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such, the Ninth Circuit seemed to put the unitary waters theory out to pasture
in response to Fidelity's argument:
[w]ere we to conclude otherwise, and hold that the massive
pumping of salty, industrial waste water into protected waters does not involve [the] discharge of a "pollutant," even
though it would degrade the receiving waters to the detriment of farmers and ranchers, we would improperly undermine the integrity of [the CWA's] prohibitions.' 79
Finally, the court addressed Fidelity's line of reasoning that only water
which had been "transformed by human activity" was a "pollutant" subject
to an NPDES permit. 'o In dismissing this quarrel, the Ninth Circuit illustrated how this line of reasoning would lead to an illogical conclusion because "water naturally laced with sulfur could be freely discharged into receiving water used for drinking water simply because the sulfur was not
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
added to the discharged water."''
court's decision and required an NPDES permit." 2
E.

The United States Supreme Court Pumping Station Case: South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians

The only decided United States Supreme Court case to discuss the
unitary waters theory was South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians."3 The Supreme Court did not decide that the
Eleventh Circuit's application of the pumping station "but-for" test was inadequate, namely that without the canal there would be no "addition" to the
Everglades."'8' The Court held it was instead "premature," and remanded
the factual issue of whether the
the case to the Eleventh Circuit to determine
5
two waters were meaningfully distinct.1

991 (E.D. Wash 1994) (explaining the CWA does not protect groundwater alone but
that courts are split regarding whether the CWA governs groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface water). Therefore, CBM water may be distinguishable from "the waters of the United States" in the unitary waters theory discussion. See id.
179. Fidelity, 325 F.3d at 1162 (citation omitted) (last alteration in original).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1163.
182. Id.
183. S.Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
at 111.
184. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
185. Id.atl11-12.
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The District Court

The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and Friends of the Everglades, an
18 6
environmental organization, together as plaintiffs filed a CWA citizen suit.
Plaintiffs complained that the regional South Florida Water Management
District (SFWMD) was "discharging a pollutant" and had failed to obtain the
proper NPDES permit for the Central and Eastern Water Project (Project).'8 7
Since 1948, the Project has converted the Everglades, which would otherwise be a sea of grass covered by a free flowing sheet of blended groundwater and rainwater, into cultivated land, among other things.' The genesis of
the lawsuit was the point where the Project collects rainwater and groundwater in a canal, C- 11, and then diverts it through a pump station, S-9, to a wetland remnant of the Everglades, WCA-3. 8 9
The Project created a seemingly harmonious balance of productivity
and protection, but there was trouble in paradise.'" A newspaper reported
that "[t]he torrent of water spewing from the backside of the pump churned
up a foot-thick blanket of yellow-brown froth. Blobs of foam drift over
murky, greenish-brown water and out into what once were the pristine environs of the Florida Everglades."' 9' The water collected in the C-i1 canal
was higher in phosphorous than the rest of the water in the area because of
run-off from agricultural fertilizers.9' A growth of algae blooms and nonnative plants was the ultimate effect to the Everglades wetland, WCA-3.
The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 94
The district court reasoned the canal, C-11, and Everglades wetland, WCA3, were not a unitary body of water:
[i]n this case an addition of pollutants exists because undisputedly water containing pollutants is being discharged
through S-9 from C- 11waters into the Everglades, both of
which are separate bodies of United States water with...
different quality levels. They are two separate bodies of wa-

186. Id. at 99.
187. Id. at 99-103.
188. Id. at 100.
189. Id. at 100-01.
190. Id. at 101.
191. Warren Richey, Everglades Cleanup at Stake in Court Case, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0114/
p02s01-usju.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). See John H. Minan, Recent Developments in EnvironmentalLaw, 36 URB. LAW. 793, 794-95 (2004).
192. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101-02.
193.by Law
Id. atArchive
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ter because the transfer of water or its contents from C-II
into the Everglades would not occur naturally.'95
The district court therefore reasoned that without the pumping station, S-9,
the two waters would not otherwise mix and held the SFWMD must97obtain
an NPDES permit." 9 The SFWMD appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
2.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. 98 First, the Eleventh Circuit put itself in the shoes of the receiving water by maintaining that
"the receiving body of water is the relevant body of navigable water" for the
court's analysis.' 99 Second, the court found that there was an "addition of a
pollutant:"
[F]or an addition of pollutants to be from a point source, the
relevant inquiry is whether - but for the point source - the
pollutants would have been added to the receiving body of
water ....When a point source changes the natural flow of
a body of water which contains pollutants and causes that
water to flow into another distinct body of navigable water
into which it would not have otherwise flowed, that point
source is the cause-in-fact of the discharge of pollutants.2"
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that had it not been for the S-9 pump there
would be no discharge of greenish-brown pollutants from the canal, C-11,
into the Everglades wetland, WCA-3.2°1 The Eleventh Circuit held an
NPDES permit was required for the pump.2 2
3.

The United States Supreme Court

The SFWMD, with the EPA weighing in as amicus curiae, appealed
three issues to the Supreme Court.2 3 The first issue, and the question over
which the Supreme Court granted certiori, was "[w]hether the pumping of
water by a state water management agency that adds nothing to the water
being pumped constitutes an 'addition' of a pollutant 'from' a point source
195. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citation omitted).
200. Id. at 103-04 (citation omitted).
201. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
202. Id. at 104.
203. Id.
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triggering the need for a [NPDES] permit under the [CWA]?",2°4 The petitioner SFWMD seemed to craft the issue in order to implicate the outside
world test for an "addition" from the dam cases and to implicate that the
"point source" must generate the pollutant to be a CWA "point source. 20 5
Impliedly in contrast to the dam cases, the Supreme Court looked to
the CWA section 502(7) definition of a "point source" and held the point
source does not need to generate the pollutant. 2' The Supreme Court explained, "[t]ellingly, the examples of 'point sources' listed by the [CWA]
include pipes, ditches, tunnels, and conduits, objects that do not themselves
generate pollutants but merely transport them. ' 20 7 Therefore, applying the
CWA definition to the instant case, the S-9 pump was a "point source" despite the fact it did not generate the phosphorus-laden water.20 8
The EPA advanced its unitary waters theory in response to whether
the water transfer "adds" a pollutant.2 9 The EPA explained that "all" the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas, "should be viewed
unitarily [as one single body of water] for purposes of NPDES permitting
requirements."2 " By the EPA's reasoning, no NPDES permit would be required, as in this case, when "water from one navigable water body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable water body.",2 1' The EPA advanced that water transfers should not be regulated by NPDES permitting
under any conditions, for example an NPDES permit is not necessary "even
if one water body were polluted and the other pristine, and the two would
2 12
not otherwise
mix.,
Thus, the S-9 pump did not need an NPDES per3
2
mit. 1

The EPA argued that the plain language of the CWA supported its
unitary waters theory. 214 The EPA asserted that Congress did not intend for
the SFWMD to obtain an NPDES permit because the CWA left out the word
'
"any" from the phrase "navigable waters."215
The EPA asserted that the

204.
205.

Id. at 104.
See id.

206.

Id. at 105.

207.

Id.

208.
209.

Id.
Id. at 105-06.

210. Id.
211. Id. at 106.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. The CWA states in pertinent part that "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable
any pointScholarship,
source .... 2006
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proper regulatory regime for this water transfer was a local, non-point source
pollution program and not the NPDES regime.2" 6
The EPA then plead to the Supreme Court for Chevron deference.217
As the CWA does not define the term "addition" in the context of what is a
CWA "discharge," the EPA argued it had supplied a reasonable interpretation of "addition" with the unitary waters theory. 2" The EPA then asserted
the practical considerations that requiring an NPDES permit for "every engineered diversion of one navigable water into another. .. ." would be an expensive NPDES regulatory jumble.219 Many states and cities filed amici
curiae briefs in support of the SFWMD on this issue, including an adamant
brief by the states of Colorado and New Mexico who were joined by eleven
other western states.220
The Supreme Court first countered the EPA's assertions that Congress did not intend for the CWA to protect individual bodies of water.22'
First, the Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta that CWA section
304(f)(2)(F) does not explicitly exempt non-point pollution sources from the
NPDES program if they also fall within the "point source" definition.222 The
Supreme Court also acknowledged in dicta that CWA sections 303(c)(2)(A)
and 303(d) may be contrary to the unitary waters approach.223 Particularly,
section 303(d) mandates that each state determine the total maximum daily
load (TMDL) of each pollutant that a single water body can sustain and then
allocate the amount each entity can pollute the water, like a pollution budget,
in order to protect that individual body of water. 224 The Supreme Court
summed up that "this approach suggests that the Act [CWA] protects individual water bodies as well as the 'waters of the United States' as a
whole. 225
The Supreme Court next noted skepticism for affording the EPA
such strong Chevron deference for its unitary waters theory. After reviewing
the record and briefs, the Court questioned whether the unitary waters theory
was a long-standing official policy because, "the Government does not identify any administrative documents in which EPA has espoused that position.
Indeed, an amicus brief filed by several former EPA officials argues that the
216. Miccosukee. 541 U.S. at 106. The EPA asserted that CWA section
304(f)(2)(F) should govern this transfer. Id.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 107.
219. Id. at 108.
220. See Colorado Brief, supra note 2.
221. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 107.
222. Id.
223. Id.

224. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
225. Id.
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agency once reached the opposite conclusion., 22 6 The Court cited the EPA's
NPDES general conditions regulation as an example of when the EPA in fact
regulates water transfers.22 7 Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the EPA's official documents it found that the
unitary waters ap228
proach could instead conflict with current EPA policy.
The Supreme Court then turned to the arguments advanced regarding the effects of requiring NPDES permits for every transfer of water.229
First, the Court examined the arguments by the EPA and amici in favor of
SFWMD. The Supreme Court summarized their concerns:
[m]any of those diversions might also require expensive
treatment to meet water quality criteria. It may be that construing the NPDES program to cover such transfers would
therefore raise the costs of water distribution prohibitively,
and violate Congress' specific instruction that "the authority
of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired" by the Act.23'
All the same, many states, tribes, and cities filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the respondents citing important policy considerations. 3 The Supreme Court summarized the arguments in favor of the Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians and the Friends of the Everglades while also suggesting a solution:
On the other hand, it may be that such permitting authority
is necessary to protect water quality, and that the States or
EPA could control regulatory costs by issuing general permits to point sources associated with water distribution pro23 2
grams.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not affirm the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the unitary waters theory.233
The Supreme Court majority, with Justice O'Connor authoring the
opinion, did not rule on the unitary waters theory definition of "addition. 2 34
226.

Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted).

227. Id. at 108 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4) (2003)).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 107-08.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 108 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.28, 123.25 (2003)).
233. Id. at 111-12.
234. Id. at 109. Commentators have surmised that the Court did not rule on the
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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The majority explained, "we find it necessary to vacate the judgment of the
[Eleventh Circuit] with respect to a third argument presented by the
[SFWMD], the unitary waters argument will be open to the parties on re'
mand."235
The Supreme Court stated that this issue was whether the two
bodies of water were meaningfully distinct which would be a factual issue
that needed further development below before the determination could be
made.236
Justice Scalia in part concurred with the majority and, in part, dissented from the majority.237 Justice Scalia concurred in the majority's holding that an NPDES permit was required for the S-9 pump despite the fact the
pump does not itself generate the pollutant.238 However, Justice Scalia found
the majority's unitary waters decision faulty on two grounds.239 First, Scalia
asserted that the majority invited the consideration of another legal theory
that was not in response to the question presented to the Court.240 Therefore,
as a procedural matter, Justice Scalia would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit without reaching the unitary waters theory question.24" ' Furthermore,
Scalia emphasized that the unitary waters theory was argued below and rejected.242 As such, there was no point in asking the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider an argument it had already rejected.243
11.

ANALYSIS

The EPA employed the unitary waters theory to interpret five different terms of the CWA accordingly implicating four important issues. The
EPA interpreted the terms "addition,

'2

"discharge,"

245

"pollutant,

'246

"from

very different opinions at the post-argument conference. Bishop, supra note 166, at
129.
235. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109.
236. Id. at 111-12.
237. Id. at 112 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 112-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
241. Id.
242. Id. (quoting as an example S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians. 280 F.3d 1364, 1368 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) ("We reject the Water District's argument that no addition of pollutants can occur unless pollutants are added
from the outside world insofar as the Water District contents the outside world cannot include another body of navigable waters."); Brief for Appellant at 10, S.Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002)
("The S-9 pump station merely moves navigable waters from one side of the levee
to another.")).
243. Id.
244. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988);
Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273, 1295 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119
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a point source, 2 47 and the omission of "any" before the term "navigable
waters, 248 with its unitary waters theory argument. Still, the plain language
of the CWA does not support these interpretations.24 9 Moreover, in Miccosukee the EPA sided with the SFWMD and amici to assert that it would be
too costly and complicated for the NPDES permitting program to regulate
every water transfer. 2" By contrast, other amici weighed in to illustrate
(1997); Catskill Mountain Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 487, 483
(2d Cir. 2001), appealdocketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2003).
245. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
246. N. Plains. Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1163
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003).
247. Catskill,273 F.3d at 483.
248. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106
(2004), reh "gdenied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
249. Matthew Duchesne, Discharging the Clean Water Act's NPDES Requirements: Why the "Unitary Waters" Theory Does Not Hold Water, 23 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 461 (2005).
250. Infra part (I1) (B) (1). Myriad amici sided with the SFWMD. Brief of
Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition, West Valley Water District
of California, the Metropolitan Denver Water Authority of Colorado, the COBB
County-Marietta Water Authority of Georgia, and the Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa
Water Storage District of California in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626) [hereinafter Water
District Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae of the City of New York, the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies, the National Association of Flood and Stormwater
Management Agencies, the American Water Works Association, and the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief for the
Utility Water Act Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, S. Fla. Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief of
Amicus Curiae National Association of Home Builders in Support of Petitioner, S.
Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626) [hereinafter
EPA Brief]; Colorado Brief, supra note 2; Brief of the National League of Cities,
Council of State Governments, International City/County Management Association,
National Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, International Municipal Lawyers Association, and U.S. Conference of Mayors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Water Re:
sources Association, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the
Central Arizona Water Conservation District, the Arizona Department of Water
Resources, the Association of California Water Agencies, the Western Urban Water
Coalition, the Western Coalition of Arid States, and the State Water Contractors, in
Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief for the Lake Worth Drainage District and the Florida
Association of Special Districts as Arnici Curiae in Support of Petitioner South Florida Water Management District, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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competing policies and assert that, as a practical matter, the NPDES permitting program should regulate much deserving water quality issues in an efficient manner.2 ' Furthermore, as amici and commentators point out, if the
EPA continues to allow unregulated discharges of dirty water to disproporida, in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief of Idaho Governor Dick Kempthorne as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and
Vegetable Association, Florida Farm Bureau Federation, American Farm Bureau
Federation, and Charles H. Bronson, as the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture in
Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95 (2004) (No. 02-626).
251. Infra part (III) (B) (2). A multitude of amici curiae sided with the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades. Brief of Amici Curiae
Trout Unlimited Inc., Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc., Theordore Gordon Flyfishers, Inc., Catskill-Delaware Natural Water Alliance, Inc., Federated Sportsmen's Clubs of Ulster County, Inc., Riverkeeper, Inc., in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)
(No. 02-626); Amicus Brief of the Association of State Wetland Managers and the
Tropical Audubon Society in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); NTEC & NCAE Brief,
supra note 18, Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amici Curiae of the Coalition of Greater Minnesota Cities and the City of Saint Cloud, Minnesota in Support
of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004) (No. 02-626); Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator Carol M.
Browner, Former Assistant Administrators Charles Fox and Robert W. Perciaepe
and Former General Counsels Jonathan Z. Cannon and Jean I. Nelson of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626) [hereinafter
Browner Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Wildlife Federation, Environmental
Confederation of Southwest Florida, and Audubon Society of the Everglades in
Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541
U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626); Amicus
Curiae Brief of Tongue & Yellowstone River Irrigation District, Tongue River Water Users' Association, and Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. in Support of
Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004) (No. 02-626); Brief of the States of New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02626); Brief of Anici Curiae National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, American Rivers, National Audubon Society, National
Parks Conservation Association and World Wildlife Fund in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
02-626).
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tionately affect certain populations in the United States, then environmental
injustice occurs.12 Finally, as the Supreme Court noted, the unitary waters
theory was not a long-standing EPA policy memorialized in notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication, as would accord Chevron deference. 2 3 The courts should instead weigh the Skidmore factors and give the
unitary waters theory little deference." 4
A.

Contrary to the CWA

Mark Twain penned, "[t]he difference between the almost-right
word & the right word is really a large matter - it's the difference between
lightning-bug & lightning." '55 The EPA advanced its interpretations of the
CWA terms "discharge," "pollutant," "addition," "from" and "point source,"
and the omission of "any" before the term "navigable waters" to support its
unitary waters theory.256 The federal courts have rightly rejected the EPA's
unitary waters interpretation of the terms "discharge," of a "pollutant," "addition," "from," and "point source. 257 Only the term "any" in relation to
"navigable waters" remains for the EPA to keep its unitary waters theory
afloat.25 8
1.

The Omission of "Any"

In Miccosukee, the EPA argued that the almost right word was "any"
and that was the difference between Congress's intent for the unitary waters
theory and Congress's intent against it. 259 The EPA advanced that the term
"any" indicates Congress's intent that various types of additions, pollutants,
and point sources are within the "regulatory reach" of the CWA.26 ° The EPA
explained CWA section 502(14) defines "discharge of a pollutant" to include
any addition of any pollutant to the navigable waters from any point
source.26 ' The EPA reasoned the conspicuous absence of the term any be252. Infra part (III) (C).
253. Infra part (III) (D). Nevertheless, the deference analysis may change as the
EPA is presently writing regulations for water transfers. Water Pollution: EPA to
Finalize Rules on Water Transfers, Livestock Operations, Pesticides in Water,
CHEM. REG. DAILY (BNA) D25 (Mar. 15, 2006).
254. Id.
255.

THE QUOTABLE MARK TWAIN: His ESSENTIAL APHORISMS, WITTICISMS &

CONCISE OPiNIONS 300 (R. Kent Rasmussen ed., Contemporary Books 1998) (citing

Letter to George Bainton (Oct. 15, 1888), on file with the Mark Twain Project)
[hereinafter Quotable Mark Twain].
256. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. EPA Brief, supra note 250, at 19.
259. Id.
260. Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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fore the phrase "the navigable waters" was the Congressional expression that
there was no need for an NPDES permit to regulate the simple conveyance
of a pollutant from one body of navigable water to another.262
More specifically, and confusingly, the EPA asserted that Congress
intended to only regulate the discharge of pollutants from sources other than
a navigable water.2 63 The EPA argued that had Congress intended NPDES
permitting for the addition of a navigable water to another navigable water,
then "it would have made that extraordinary intention manifest." 2" The
EPA made the convoluted argument that Congress would have used the language "a specific portion of the navigable waters" in the NPDES permitting
sections of the CWA rather than simply navigable waters if it had intended
NPDES permitting to regulate water transfers. 265 The EPA seemed to argue
that permitting at the "point source" of the water transfer was too late because "[w]hatever pollutants the waters contain are already in the 'waters of
the United States' when those waters pass through a point source."'
Furthermore, the EPA maintained that while "[s]uch an activity can conceivably
lead to changes in water quality, but that does not, within the normal meaning of the relevant terms, constitute an 'addition' of any pollutant to 'the
waters of the United States.' 2 67 The EPA concluded that non-point source
pollution programs and other programs "which attack the problem at its
source" should instead govern these water quality issues.268
The EPA's unitary waters interpretation of the plain language of the
CWA does not hold water. The purpose of the CWA is "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 2 69 2Congress
wrote the CWA for a singular "Nation" with many, plural,
"waters. 70 Congress did not write the CWA for the "Nation's water," in
the singular, as if to indicate one unitary body of water.2 7' Congress also
recognized that the Nation's many waters may be in different conditions and
therefore the purpose was to restore some bodies of water and to maintain
others.272 If the purpose of the CWA was to clean up the Nation's one body
of water, then it would have been enacted only to restore the Nation's wa262. Daniel M. Krainin & Ami M. Grace, Agricultural Management Case Law
Update, 9 A.B.A. AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. 3, 4 (Jan. 2005).
263. Travis Trimble, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 56 MERCER L. REv. 1255, 1264
(2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
264. EPA Brief, supra note 250, at 19.
265. Id. at 19-20 (citation omitted).
266. Id. at 16.
267. Id.
268. Id.
at 27.
269. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
270. See id.
271. See id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
272. See id.
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ter. 273 Furthermore, Congress wrote the CWA for the purpose of restoring
and maintaining the integrity of the Nation's many waters. 2' The Second
Circuit rightly noted that the chemical, physical, and/or biological integrity
of an individual stream may be changed by artificially mixing it with a different stream or transferring it to a completely different water basin. 275 For
example, the integrity of cold water will be damaged by the addition of
warm water because it will destroy the natural habitat for cold water trout,
which is part of the stream's biological integrity.276 Therefore, as the Second
Circuit explained, the unitary waters theory is contrary to the aim of the
CWA because the natural chemical, physical, or biological integrity can be
destroyed by mixing one of the Nation's waters with another of the Nation's
waters.277
2.

Protection for Individual Bodies of Water

As the Supreme Court illustrated, the EPA's unitary waters theory is
incorrect because at least three specific sections of the CWA do protect individual bodies of water.27 ' Notably, CWA section 301(a) states "the dis'
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."279
Even if the water was already polluted, the act of discharging more pollutant in already
polluted water is still unlawful.2"' Section 301(a) instead regulates all discharges in order to protect individual bodies of water from act of discharging. 28 1 Moreover, section 402(b) allows a State to propose an NPDES regulatory regime for "navigable waters within its jurisdiction. 282 Navigable
waters under that State's jurisdiction are then protected separately from the
waters of another State's jurisdiction, treating them as a body of water
within the border of each individual State and not as one unitary body of
water within the borders of the United States as a whole. 2 3 As a further example indicating individual water protection, CWA section 502(12)(B) protects "the waters of the contiguous zone" or "the ocean" from a discharge of
a pollutant.284 Under the CWA regime, the navigable waters in one jurisdic273. See id.
274. Id.
275. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
273 F.3d 481, 494 (2d Cir. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 03-7203 (2d Cir. Feb. 21,
2003).

276.
277.
278.

See id.
Id.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107-

09 (2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).

279. Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (2000).
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. Clean Water Act § 402(b).
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tion, or contiguous zone, or the ocean, are then protected individually at the
very least from waters of another jurisdiction, non-contiguous zone, or nonocean.285 None of these provisions, then, implicate the unitary waters theory.
As the Supreme Court explained, CWA section 303(d) is the most
telling because it mandates that each State determine the TMDL of each
pollutant that an individual water body can sustain.286 To provide this protection for individual waters, a State must first identify distinct bodies of
water within its borders.28 7 A State must then classify each distinct and individual body of water.288 Based on each individual body of water's classification, a State assigns the TMDL that individual water body can bear in order
to protect it, separately.28 9 As the Supreme Court summarized, "[t]his approach suggests that the Act protects individual water bodies as well as the
'waters of the United States' as a whole."2' Hence, a commentator has reasoned the CWA was "aimed at protecting individual bodies of water, as
shown by its provisions for water quality standards" along with the other
individual water protection measures discussed above.29 '
3.

Conflict with Current NPDES Regulations

The Supreme Court announced, and commentators agree, that the
unitary waters theory "could also conflict with current NPDES regulations."292 For example, a published EPA regulation governing NPDES permit conditions discusses intake water as distinct from the discharging water
as opposed to discussing the two as a unitary body of water.293 This regulation outlines how dischargers may get credit for pollutants already in the
intake water.294 As such, the discharger's effluent limitations or standards
for the discharge water can be adjusted for those pollutants that were already
in the intake water.2 95 To receive a pollution credit, the discharger must
demonstrate that "the control system it proposes or uses to meet applicable
285. See id.
286. S.Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107
(2004), reh "gdenied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004); Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C.
1313(d) (2000), TMDL stands for total maximum daily load. Id.
287. § 303(d)(1)(A)-(B), 303(d)(3).
288. § 303(d)(1)(C).
289. Id. However, the EPA has been slow to implement CWA section 303(d).
Benson, supra note 16, at 221.
290. S.Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107
(2004), reh 'gdenied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
291. Philip Weinberg, 2003-2004 Survey ofNew York Law, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV.
965, 976-77 (2005) (citations omitted).
292. Trimble, supra note 263, at 1264 (quoting Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 107).
293. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45 (2005).
294. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
295. Id.
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technology-based limitations and standards would, if properly installed and
operated, meet the limitations and standards in the absence of pollutants in
the intake waters."2'" Dischargers can only get this credit if the discharger
proves that the intake water is drawn from the same body of water as the
body of water receiving the discharge.29 This credit is not available when
the intake water is from a body of water distinctfrom the receiving body of
water.29 Therefore, the EPA's NPDES regulatory regime will treat the discharge differently when the intake water and the receiving water in the transfer are two distinctbodies of water, thus protecting the receiving water.299
4.

NPDES Discharges vs. Dredge and Fill Discharges

Commentators have observed the EPA's unitary waters construction
of the CWA regarding NPDES discharge permits (CWA section 402) conflicts with the EPA's CWA construction regarding dredge and fill permits
(CWA section 404)."o The rules of statutory construction, and common
sense, dictate that phrases in two statutory sections must be interpreted consistently with one another.3"' All discharges of pollutants are strictly barred
under CWA section 301 unless the discharges are covered by a CWA permit.3 2 Therefore, the first element of both NPDES permits and dredge and
fill permits is the "discharge". 3 ' Discharging dredge and fill material in3
3 5°
34
cludes activities such as sidecasting, placer mining, and deep ripping. 1
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. Allison M. Dornsife, Comment, From a Nonpollutant into a Pollutant:Revising EPA's Interpretationof the Phrase "Dischargeof any Pollutant" in the Context ofNPDES Permits, 35 ENVTL. L. 175 (2005).
301. Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (citations omitted); First City Bank v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 111 F.3d 433,
438-39 (6th Cir. 1997).
302. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (2000).
303. Id. § 402, § 404. Section 301 incorporates the definition of discharge from

CWA section 502(12). Id.
304. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir 2000). Sidecasting is the
piling of dirt taken from ditch-digging or channeling activities and piling it on the
sides of the ditch. Id. at 332.
305. Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990). Placer mining runs
water through sediment from stream beds, for example, to force the metal ores to
settle to the bottom while the sediment remains suspended in the water that is then
released back into the stream. Id. at 1282. This "sluicing process" is much like a
contemporary "panning for gold" process. See, e.g., id.
306. Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th
Cir. 2001), aff'd, 537 U.S. 99 (2002). Deep ripping results when four-to-seven foot
long metal prongs poke holes deep in the earth and the displaced soil is drug behind
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None of these activities increase the amount of pollutant in the navigable
waters, or add pollutants from the outside world, because they disturb what
is already there.3" 7 Broader still, a dredge and fill "discharge" includes material such as grass from a riverbed that never leaves the river but rather is
simply "churned up" and re-deposited.3 8 In summary, the EPA has interpreted discharge from CWA section 301 broadly in the dredge and fill context and narrowly in the NPDES context thus violating canons of statutory
construction.
B.

NPDESPermittingis Flexible and Effective

In his personal writings, Mark Twain composed that "[t]here are two
times in a man's life when he should not specu-late: when he can afford it,
and when he can't.'' 31 In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court stated that if
NPDES permits are required for simple water transfers then "thousands of
new permits might have to be issued, especially to western states, whose
water supply networks often rely on engineered transfers among various
natural water bodies. Many of those diversions might also require expensive
treatment to meet water quality criteria."3 ' Commentators have summarized
"such requirements could impose serious burdens on water supply projects,
but could also be necessary to protect water quality. ' 1 '
1.

Potential for Increased NPDES Regulation

The states of Colorado and New Mexico, writing for eleven western
states, led the amici charge to resist NPDES permitting for water transfers." 2
Colorado alone has more than several hundred water transfers that may each
require NPDES permits if the unitary waters theory is rejected.3" 3 Commentators have noted that western states do "rely heavily on transfers from various natural water bodies to supply their citizens with water of sufficient
quality."'a'
Commentators and Water District amici argued that NPDES
permitting for these transfers would result in inevitable delays, thus produc'
ing "significant practical consequences."315
The first inevitable delay is a
307.

Id.; Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1285; Deaton, 209 F.3d at 337.

308.

U.S. v.M.C.C. of Fla. Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1985).

309. Quotable Mark Twain, supranote 255, at 261 (citations omitted).
310. S.Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v.Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 108 (2004),
reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004) (citation omitted).
311. Benson, supra note 16, at 213.
312. Colorado Brief, supra note 2.
313. Id.
at 3 n.2.
314. Lawrence R. Liebesman & John H. Turner, Jr., The Supreme Court's Decision in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians:
Leaving the Scope of Regulation Under the Clean Water Act in "Murky Waters,"

SK037 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 131,139 (2004).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
315. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108; Liebesman, supra note 314, at 139.
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result of water districts and others needing to apply for and receive thousands of new NPDES permits for both existing and proposed water transfers. a16 Commentators have explained that there is also potential for more
expensive water due to the permitting and treatment to achieve NPDES water quality conditions.3" 7 In order to achieve the water quality conditions in
the permits, water may need to be stored and treated at the transfer point." 8
Commentators have illustrated two possible consequences of such storage
and treatment: expensive treatment facilities would need to be built in pristine Western areas;319 and water would be delayed in these treatment facilities. 2 ' This delay of the water may equal less water to allocate.32' State
water allocation rights cannot be "superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired" by the EPA as per the Wallop Amendment to the goals section of the
CWA.32 2 Commentators and amici argue the ultimate issue is then that
NPDES permitting for water transfers would interfere with state water allocation rights, violating the CWA.323 Nevertheless, not all states agree.
2.

Potential for Innovative NPDES Regulation

In Miccosukee, the eastern states of New York, Connecticut, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Vermont, and Pennsylvania joined Oklahoma and Washington,
from west of the Mississippi River, to support NPDES permitting for water
transfers.324 As an example of a state in support of NPDES regulation of
water transfers, the State of Pennsylvania uniformly administers its NPDES
program to regulate transfers of water.325 In 1986, the Pennsylvania courts
held that water transfers required NPDES permits. 3 6 After nearly twenty
years of experience, Pennsylvania made the case to the Supreme Court:
Since 1986, Pennsylvania has not experienced any of the litany of problems that [SFWMD] and its [amici curiae] predict. The NPDES permit program authorizes the use of
general permits that can be issued quickly without significant administrative burden, and many of the NPDES permits
also authorize the use of Best Management Practices
(BMP's) in place of more traditional numeric effluent limi316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Liebesman, supra note 314, at 139.
Id.
Nichols, supra note 37, at 122.
Id.
Water District Brief, supra note 250, at 12.

321.

Nichols, supra note 37, at 122.

322.
323.
324.

Clean Water Act § 101(g), 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(g) (2000).
Id.; Nichols, supra note 37, at 122.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.

325. Pennsylvania Brief, supra note 251, at 5.
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tations in appropriate situations. The NPDES permit program also expressly authorizes compliance schedules where
the permittee
needs additional time to achieve compli327
ance.
The EPA authorized the use of these general NPDES permits through its
regulations.3 28 The EPA authorized NPDES general permit categories to
include: stormwater point sources, point sources from the same or substantially similar types of operations, point sources with similar wastes or disposal practices, and point sources with the same operating conditions.329
These general permits can be as large as a whole State or as small as a sewer
district.33 As illustrated by the State of Pennsylvania, the EPA general permitting regulation thus allows a State to craft a manageable NPDES permit
program.
Even if the Eleventh Circuit confirms on remand that an NPDES
permit is needed for the Miccosukee water transfer, "' the western states'
hands are not tied. As Pennsylvania illustrated, states may create such authorized general categories as: concentrated animal feeding operations
(CAFO's), stormwater associated with construction activities, and municipal
storm sewer permits.332 Other States could create such general permits for
categories of use in the style of Pennsylvania and consistent with longstanding EPA policy. 333 A State could develop a general permit for each of
its water basins.3" Or, a State could develop a general permit for each size
of water transfer.33 5 The EPA has already promulgated a general NPDES
permit regulation,336 it is now up to the states to implement the regulation
and craft their program in a way that best protects water quality in an efficient and effective manner.
Commentators, along with the states of Colorado and New Mexico,
advocated that the Wallop Amendment is a barrier to NPDES permitting, 3"
but perhaps it invites an innovative management opportunity. The Wallop
amendment, CWA section 101(g), states:

327. Pennsylvania Brief, supra note 251, at 5.
328. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (2005).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 109 (2004),
reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
332. Pennsylvania Brief, supra note 251, at 16-17.
333. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 122.28.
334. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28.
335. See, e.g. id.
336. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
337. Nichols, supra note 37, at 121.
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[iut is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State
to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not
be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this
chapter. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to supersede or abrogate
rights to quantities of water which have been established by
any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and
local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources.33 8
Developing general NPDES basin-by-basin permit requirements
through a coordinated local, state, tribal, and federal approach may provide
the comprehensive solutions the Wallop Amendment contemplates.339 For
example, the state of Georgia is undertaking a state-wide plan that accounts
for water transfers on a water basin by water basin approach in order to meet
the water quantity needs of its citizens. 3" As a result, the EPA's general
permitting regulations set up a vehicle through which federal agencies can
cooperate with State agencies to develop water quality solutions.
In addition to general permitting, State and local governments could
better manage their NPDES programs through cost-sharing with national
financial assistance. 4 Commentators have noted that the NPDES regulatory
regime currently provides little incentive for compliance.342 Under the
NPDES program, State and local governments respond to great regulatory
demands with few regulatory resources.343 The cost combined with the fact
that "[e]nvironmental impacts usually are the cumulative product of many
sources, and polluters frequently can impose the bulk of pollution problems
on those downstream. '' 3 " Therefore, commentators note it is not surprising
that for local governments "the benefits of environmental expenditures are
likely to receive a lower priority than other expenditures whose benefits are
concentrated more locally., 345 The NPDES program may then become more

338.

Clean Water Act § 101(g), 33 U.S.C. §1251(g) (2000).

The Wallop

Amendment was named after one of its authors, former United States Senator Malcolm Wallop from Wyoming. Benson, supranote 16, at 209.
339. See supra notes 331-38 and accompanying text.
340. Stephen E. Draper, Sharing Water Through Interbasin Transfer and Basin of
Origin Protection in Georgia: Issuesfor Evaluation in Comprehensive State Water
Planningfor Georgia's Surface Water Rivers and Groundwater Aquifers, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 339 (2004).
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efficient if water transfers are regulated because the regulation's effects will
reach upstream to where the pollution actually began.3"
Additionally, States could get more bang for their buck through the
opportunity to regulate agricultural runoff and other such non-point sources
of pollution through the NPDES program. 4 The CWA expressly excluded
regulation of non-point source pollution from its NPDES program, thereby
tying the EPA's hands when it comes to CWA enforcement. 34 Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court noted in Miccosukee, the NPDES program does
not expressly exclude non-point sources of pollution if such sources could
also be point sources.349 Commentators have noted that regulation of nonpoint source pollution that reaches States' water systems through a pump
system or dam would address a long-standing thorn in the side of CWA enforcement because so many sources of pollution were excluded. 350 Therefore, once the non-point source pollution merges with the point source, its
effect on water quality can be regulated through the NPDES permitting pro35
gram.

1

As a practical matter, NPDES permitting for water transfers and
dams should be manageable even without general permitting and cost35 2
sharing.
The D.C. Circuit did the math in the context of NPDES dam
permitting and concluded a small number of permits would actually be required.35 3 Before the D.C. Circuit, the EPA had advanced it would be required to complete the impossible task of issuing two million new NPDES
permits.35 4 The D.C. Circuit rebuked:
Yet, so far as the record shows, most, if not all the dams that
cause water quality problems are large hydroelectric dams.
Thus, the number of dams that would require permits is
probably no more than the 50,000 "large" dams in the country, and quite possibly only the 3,000 or so dams that are
large enough to generate significant amounts of hydroelec-

346.
347.

See id.
John H. Davidson, Factory Fields: Agricultural Practices, Polluted Water
and Hypoxic Oceans, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 33, 35 (2005).
348. ld. at 33, 34.
349. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106
(2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
350. Davidson, supra note 347, at 3.
351. Id. at 35; Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106.
352. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 181, 182 (D.C. Cir 1982).
353. Id.
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tric power. That is manageable even if it turns out to be impracticable to issue categorical permits ....I
Moving to the math from the pumping station cases, the Supreme
Court projected that the total number of permits required for water transfers
in the United States would also only be in the thousands, though the true
number remains to be seen.356 In any case, there are other important policy
considerations beyond the cost of regulation that weigh heavily in the equation.
C.

UnregulatedDischargescan be EnvironmentalInjustice

In Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World, Mark
Twain wrote that "[b]y trying we can easily learn to endure adversity. Another man's, I mean. '357 The EPA's unitary waters theory begs not only
water quality questions but environmental justice questions as well.35 The
SFWMD and other similarly situated amici complain of the added time and
cost that an NPDES permitting regime for simple water transfers would
bring.359 In the interim, the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and other similarly
situated amici are already bearing the cost of unregulated discharges.
The EPA defines environmental justice as:
the fair treatment of all races, cultures, incomes, and educational levels with respect to the development and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies, with
fair treatment "implying" that no subgroup of people should
be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative environmental impacts of pollution or environmental
hazards due to a lack of political or economic strength. 6
In the unitary waters theory context, the EPA is forcing the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians to shoulder the burden of greenish-brown pollutant

355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108.
Quotable Mark Twain, supra note 255, at 3 (citation omitted).
Drew Melville, "Whiskey isfor Drinking": Recent Water Law Developments

in Florida,20 J. LAND

USE
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359. See supra notes 312-23 and accompanying text.
360. NTEC & NCAI Brief, supra note 18, at 7.
361. Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitive Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 103, 106 (quoting EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
& EMERGENCY
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ENVTL.
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spewing blobs of foam into the once pristine Everglades.3 62 The Miccosukee
Tribe explained:
[SFWMD] is collecting, conveying and disposing of mixed
waters to the benefits of the C-I I Basin, not for the benefit
of the Everglades, and in doing so it is intentionally discarding the pollutants into lands where the Tribe lives and
works, impairing Tribal uses in order to protect the developments in the west.363
However, as commentators have noted, the Supreme Court chose to ignore
the issue of environmental injustice completely despite these arguments by
the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and similarly situated amici curiae.3 64 The
decision is void of one mere mention of the issue.365
The value of clean water means "different things to different people. 366 Commentators illustrate, "[t]o many individuals and societies, water
symbolizes security, opportunity, and self-determination. People in areas
where water scarcity is the norm associate water with life, power, and
'
status."367
The water pollution effects in Indian country go beyond even
368
these. Commentators have understood, "for Native American tribes, land
is not fungible ....The loss of place may impact the identity and destiny of
the tribe itself. '369 Such effects include the loss of the right and the place to
conduct religious and cultural practices.37 ° Tribal amici pointed out that
economic effects are another issue. 371' Amici illustrate that due to the greenish-brown water spewing from the pumping station, the Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians has suffered economic loss from off-reservation hunting, fishing,
and gathering. 372 Nevertheless, these amici asserted that states are not likely
to make decisions that raise their own costs, such as increasing the cost of
362. NTEC & NCAI Brief, supra note 18, at 1-2; See Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida at 7-8, S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist., v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626) [hereinafter Miccosukee Brief].
363. Miccosukee Brief, supra note 362, at 36 n.6.
364. Kristin Carden, Case Comment, South Florida Water Management Districtv.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 549, 556, 560 (2004); ac-

cord Melville supra note 358, at 500.
365. Melville, supra note 358, at 556.
366. Draper, supra note 340, at 351.
367. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
368. Suagee, supra note 18.
369. NTEC & NCAI Brief, supra note 18, at 13 (quoting JUDITH

ROYSTER, THE
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS

157-58 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999)).
370. Id. at 12-13.
371. Id. at 8.
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water quality regulation.373 By contrast, the federal government owes a trust
responsibility to protect Tribal assets.374 Amici concluded federal NPDES
permitting is best suited to balance the competing interests of two sovereigns
(a state and a tribe) concerning interstate water pollution. 375 As such,
NPDES permitting should regulate the transfer of polluted water in order to
create a forum for those disproportionately impacted to exercise some control over their surroundings.
D. Due Little Deference
In his further travels around the world, Mark Twain observed, "[t]o
succeed in the other trades, capacity must be shown; in the law, concealment
of it will do., 376 The EPA's unitary waters theory was given Chevron deference in the analysis of the dam cases.377 The dam cases were litigated with a
now-antiquated interpretation of the Chevron judicial deference doctrine,
and commentators suggest this faulty "[EPA] position ...should no longer
be entitled to the deference it has enjoyed for well over two decades. 378
Today, "a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment is
express congressional authorization to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed. 379 The pumping station cases were skeptical of affording the
EPA's unitary waters theory Chevron deference."
Most recently, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed the EPA's argument because the
EPA could not point the Court to a single rule enacted through notice-andcomment rulemaking, a single adjudication, or a single public administrative
document.3 8' Therefore, in the upcoming Eleventh Circuit remand litigation,
the EPA's unitary waters theory should not be given Chevron deference.38 2

373. Id. at 7.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 9.
376. Quotable Mark Twain, supra note 255, at 157 (citation omitted).
377. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988).
378. Dornsife, supra note 300, at 179.
379. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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2003); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1164
n.4 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003).
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382. See id. at 107, 109; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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In the absence of Chevron deference, the Eleventh Circuit ought to
instead apply the Skidmore factors to evaluate what weight to award the EPA
'
When the agency has
in its unitary waters interpretation of "addition."383
nor
formal adjudication,
rulemaking
engaged in neither notice-and-comment
the court will defer to the agency's interpretation based on its persuasiveness
after weighing: "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality,
and relative expertness .

. . ."

The court may then give a "spectrum of

'
The four
responses" ranging from "great respect" to "near indifference."385
Skidmore factors reveal that the EPA's unitary waters theory is due little
judicial respect.

In analyzing the first Skidmore factor, commentators have avowed
that the degree of the EPA's "care" in advancing the unitary waters theory
should be discounted. 6 A commentator cites that the EPA's "endless" and
"wasteful" unitary waters litigation is diverting resources from the $8 billion
Everglades restoration project.38 7 Thus the EPA chose to litigate the issue,
taking time, resources, and focus away from the goal of the Everglades Restoration Project. 8 8 Moreover, in the dam context, instead of litigating the
unitary waters theory in Consumers Power, 389 the EPA only needed to instruct the defendants to place a net before the turbines to catch the fish and
prevent the fish smoothie.
The treatment of the second Skidmore factor of the agency's "consistency" in upholding the unitary waters theory is unclear. Throughout the
litigation in the case law, the EPA held the unitary waters line before the
courts of appeals in both the dam cases and the pumping station cases .3
However, as the Supreme Court elucidated in Miccosukee, former EPA Administrator Carol Browner, among others, weighed in as amicus curiae to
state that the long-standing EPA policy was to require NPDES permits for
383. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (holding that an
agency's informal interpretation will given deference to the degree to which it persuades the court thus reviving the Skidmore factors.).
384. Id. at 288 (footnotes omitted).
385.

Id.

386.

Cf Bishop, supra note 166, at 126.
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Id.
Id.

389.

See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir.

1988).
390. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(advancing the outside world framework); Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584 (arguing application of the outside world analysis); Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273,
1296 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1997) (making the case for the
singular entity theory); S. Fla. Water Mgrt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95, 107 (2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 95, 109 (2004) (advancing the unihttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/8
tary waters theory).
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dams and this policy logically extended to water transfers.39 ' More recently,
after the Miccosukee litigation before the Supreme Court, EPA's General
Counsel, Ann R. Klee, and Assistant Administrator for Water, Benjamin H.
Grumbles, issued a memo to EPA regional administrators.39 2 The subject of
the memo was: "Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of
'
The memo seemed to admit the
the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers."393
EPA's error in claiming the unitary waters theory was a long-standing
agency position on NPDES permits as it "has not been fully articulated in an
administrative document. '394 The memo attempted to distinguish the former
Administrator Browner's opinion because her opinion did not address the
issue of a CWA "addition. '395 However, as commentators, the state of Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court pointed out, EPA regulations do regulate
water transfers and the "addition" of one water to another distinct body of
water.39 Thus, the consistency of the EPA's unitary waters position is questionable.
The third and fourth Skidmore factors do not appear to strengthen
the case for deference to the unitary waters theory. The Supreme Court provided insight into the third Skidmore factor.397 It explained that there has
been no degree of "formality" as evidenced by a lack of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, formal adjudication, or public documents published in the Federal Register.398 Regarding the final factor, the EPA's "relative expertness"
regarding "the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's
391. Browner Brief, supra note 251, at 17.
392. Ann R. Klee & Benjamin H. Grumbles, Agency Interpretationon Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers, memorandum,
http://www.epa.gov/ogc/documents/water-transfers.pdf (last visited on Mar. 23,
2006) [hereinafter Klee Memo].
393. Id. at 1.
394. Id. at 2.
395. Id. at 2 n.5. In examining In Re Riverside IrrigationDist. LTD. & 17 others,
Op. No 21, (E.P.A.G.C. Jun. 27, 1975) 1975 WL 23864, which former Administrator Browner references, the Klee memo stated:
That opinion did not specifically address the question of whether
an "addition" has occurred when a navigable water is merely conveyed to another navigable water. Instead, the specific issue that
opinion addressed was whether "irrigation return flow [is] a properly permitable [point] source within the meaning of sections 301
and 402 of the [Clean Water] Act."
Id.
396. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.45, 122.28 (2005).
397. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107
(2004), reh 'g denied, 541 U.S. 95, 109 (2004).
398. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (2000); Miccosukee,
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waters," is undisputed as it is the agency charged with administering the
CWA.a9 Nevertheless, as the D.C. District Court pointed out, the EPA
brings no scientific expertness to the table when it comes to construing the
plain language of the CWA.' The EPA's unitary waters theory is due little
deference when weighing the Skidmore factors of formality, expertness,
care, and the complex issue of consistency.
IV. CONCLUSION

The EPA's unitary waters theory is all wet. The NPDES regulatory
regime should properly police water transfers in order to clean up the Nation's dirty waters for the benefit of all citizens. The unitary waters theory is
contrary to the CWA, to current NPDES permits, and to the EPA's interpretation of "discharge" in the context of dredge and fill permits.4 ' 1 NPDES
water quality regulation of water transfers and dams presents an opportunity
for innovative, cooperative, and practical permitting solutions with costsharing prospects." 2 NPDES regulation also provides an opportunity for the
much-needed protection of important cultural areas. 3 The courts can help
this process along by giving minimal deference to the EPA's latest attempt
to keep its unitary waters theory afloat."
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